This paper attempts to give an overview of the pricing of risks in a pure exchange economy, where trade takes place at time zero and where uncertainty is revealed at time one. An economic equilibrium model under uncertainty is formulated, where conditions characterizing a Pareto optimal exchange equilibrium are derived. We present two sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, and demonstrate how equilibria can be characterized through several examples. Uniqueness of equilibrium is also discussed. Special attention is given to the principal components that the premiums in a reinsurance market must depend upon. We also apply the general theory to the risk exchange problem between a policyholder and an insurer, and in particular we compute market premiums of the resulting optimal contracts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The following model is interpreted as a reinsurance syndicate, in which I insurers trade among themselves. We take as given (a) The preference of insurer it I = {l, 2 ..... I}, ~i, represented by expected utility E{ui(')~., where u/> 0 and ui" < O. (b) The initial net reserve of insurer i, represented by the random variable x,-, iEI.
We assume that each xi ~ L2(-Q, .P'-, P) where (£2, ._9"-, P) is the probability space on which all the xi's are defined, all the insurers agree on the probability ASTIN BULLETIN, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1993 measure P (homogeneous beliefs), and the events Y on which P is defined are generated by the I net reserves, which we sometimes call the initial portfolios, i.e., .~= a{xt, x2 .... , xl}. This means that the uncertainty in the model is totally described by the initial portfolios xi, i~ I. We briefly comment on the realism of homogeneous beliefs in reinsurance: The assumption about homogeneous beliefs appears reasonable for a reinsurance market, where trade is supposed to take place under conditions of umberrimae.fidei, and no information is supposed to be hidden. Our pricing results for a reinsurance market are likely to influence premiums in the market for direct insurance as well. In the direct market the assumption about homogeneous beliefs seems more unrealistic. It is likely that the buyers of insurance have more information about the risk they try to cover, than the insurers. This asymmetric information gives rise to adverse selection. In addition, the buyers can directly or indirectly influence events so that the probability distributions of the risks are altered. This can happen since the insurer is usually unable to monitor the insured, and the phenomenon gives rise to moral hazard. Whereas the problem of morel hazard does not seem important in a reinsurance market, the problem of adverse selection may occur since the ceding company usually has more detailed information about the risks they underwrite than the reinsurers. It may of course be tempting for some direct insurer to sell some "bad risks" in the reinsurance market. In the long run this "practice" is not likely to pay off, since the reinsurance industry makes heavy use of a detailed rating system for insurance companies (i.e., Insurance Solvency International), and there exist penalties for such actions.
The competitive equilibrium (CE) that we shall demonstrate in this model, we claim to be of particular interest in insurance, where its importance has been partly overlooked. Insurers of today seem to be turning to finance markets and their models, often without the understanding of the most basic exchange economy that can be thought of, and which we think is of the utmost importance to general insurance markets; the syndicate described in this paper. The present model has also been a key motivation of much of the financial equilibrium theory which has dominated the literature of financial economics.
The usual formulation in insurance settings has been to derive the front of Pareto optimal (PO) risk exchanges, generally uncountable in number. This does not help to find unique premiums, as there will be one set of prices for each different Pareto optimal point. In order to find a well-defined set of premiums in this model, the budget constraints of the insurers must be employed. A well-posed model will then normally determine a unique set of equilibrium premiums subject to a normalization condition.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the economic model of uncertainty. Here we formulate one set of sufficient conditions, the Inada conditions, for the existence of a unique equilibrium, and we demonstrate some properties of this equilibrium. In Section 3 we demonstrate that the CE is Pareto optimal, and in Section 4 we present examples of how optimal sharing rules might look like, and what their market values are. Here we introduce a different set of sufficient conditions, called properness, for the existence of an equilibrium, which turns out to be satisfied in the examples. We discuss when a syndicated market can restrict attention to proportional treaties, and when non-proportional treaties are needed. In the latter case, we argue that this has nothing to do with the market being "incomplete", as has been suggested in the economic literature. At least this is a definition which we do not find fruitful. In Section 5 we demonstrate some properties of risk tolerances, and in Section 6 we risk adjust the probability measure in the present one-period framework. In Section 7 we present an insurance version of the capital asset pricing model, and in Section 8 we rewrite our results on portfolios to treat insurance premiums directly in this syndicate. In Section 9 we employ the results of Sections 2-4 to the general treatment of the risk exchange between a policyholder and an insurer, and in particular to the computation of market premiums of optimal contracts in such models. We end our exposition in Section 10 with some concluding remarks.
THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF UNCERTAINTY
In the market the I insurers exchange parts of their initial portfolios among themselves. As a result of these exchanges insurer i obtains a final portfolio, represented by the random variable y~ (xl, x2,..., xO (.) . In order to prevent arbitrage possibilities this must be a linear functional on L2(~, J, P).
As an illustration of this point, assume on the contrary that 7t(yl+y2) > 7t(y0+Tt(y2) for two risks Ym and Y2. Then one agent could insure the bundle (Yl +Y2) and reinsure separately Yl and Y2. The cash flow at time zero equals {zt(yl+y2)-~z(yO-Tt(y2)} > 0. The cash flow at time one equals -(Yt +Y2)+Yl +Y2 = 0. This agent has no obligations at time one, so he has made a riskless profit at time zero. This is a money pump, or a "free lunch", which is inconsistent with an economic equilibrium. By the Riesz' represenation theorem there exists some function U' e L 2 (~, J', P) such that
Since g= ¢z{xl, x2, ..., xl}, it follows that U' = U'(xl, x2, ..., xl) is some Borel-measurable function of (xl, x2 ..... x/) (see e.g. TUCKER (1967), Th.l.l).
(So far the prime on U' is just a matter of notation. Later we show that under the present conditions U' (.) is also a derivative of some function as well.) The statement in (2.2) means, in economic terms, that the market is complete in the following sense (BORCH (1962) A market model is complete if it assigns a unique value ~z(x) to an arbitrary random variable x ~ L 2 (,.Q, ,.~-, P).
The economic theory of pricing of contingent claims started with Arrow's paper in (1953) . BORCH (1960-62-68 ) developed these ideas further, and below we present some of the elements of this theory. Consider the following problem :
subject to the budget constraint
In order to avoid bankruptcy problems we also assume that Yi -> 0 a.s. An equilibrium is a collection (n; Yl, Y2, --., Yt) consisting of a price functional ~ (.) and a feasible allocation (Yl, Y2, -.., Yt) such that for each i, y, solves problem (2.3-4).
The market value of the portfolio cannot increase when exchanges are settled at market prices. The expected utility of the portfolio can however be increased by such exchanges, and this is the very purpose of reinsurance transactions.
The Lagrangian of this problem is (2.5) -.~(Yi; 2,) = E{u, (y,(xl, x2 ..... x,) 
For the purpose of the first result below, in addition to the assumptions (a) and (b) we now make the following three assumptions The assumption u/(0+)= + c~ guarantees that the constraint XM > 0 will never be active, called the Inada condition. The condition u,' (x) --, 0 as x --* oo can be thought of as a saturation effect. We now present a theorem giving sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Assumption (d) is sufficient for uniqueness. The theorem also characterizes the equilibrium.
Theorem 1 :
Suppose assumptions (a)-(c) and (e) hold. Then there exists a CE characterized by (2.6) u/(yi(xl, x2 ..... xi)) = 2iU' (xt, x2 ..... xl) , it I, P-a.s., where 2i are positive constants. If in addition (d) holds, then the CE is unique.
Proof:
Existence of CE in infinite dimensional spaces under out conditions are shown by DUFFLE and ZAME (1989) . Uniqueness of an interior CE under the additional assumption (d) has been shown by KARATZAS et al. (1988) . As for the characterization (2.6), since the Bernoulli utility functions ui (') given program for all i. Again because of concavity, the conditions (2.6) are the Euler equations of the maximization problem of the Lagrangian in y (.), which in the present situation are necessary and sufficient for the solution of this sub-problem, since the optimal solution happens to be interior by our conditions. Thus the equations (2.6) must hold.
Remarks: --
Uniqueness means relative to a normalization. In particular this means that if 2 = (2t, 22 ..... 2t) and if 2' = (2'1,2~ .... ,2)) are two different vectors corresponding to a unique CE, then there exists a constant c > 0 such that 2=c2 ', cn(y; 2) = n(y; 2 ') and yi(x; 2) = yi(x; 2'), where yi(x; 2), i= 1, 2,..., I, are the optimal sharing rules, or equilibrium allocations, corresponding to the vector 2, and n(y; ~) stands for the corresponding pricing rule. Thus equilibrium premiums can be determined only up to a multiplicative constant, since there can always be a re-evaluation of currency; this is not going to afffect, however, the way in which the insurers share the risks among themselves.
--The present economic interpretation of the function U'(x) is that it represents the marginal utility of the market as a whole at the "portfolio point" x. Another common interpretation, especially in financial economics and in macroeconomics, is that U'(x) represents the marginal utility function of some representative insurer, or even of some abstract central planner. A final interpretation is also possible; U'(x) is the shadow price per unit of P-probability when x (w) = x (we return to this in Section 3).
--In Section 4 we present a different set of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. It turns out that these conditions are inconsistent with the lnada condition (c), but otherwise they appear to be less restrictive. Here we need the above conditions in order to secure an interior optimum.
Some immediate consequences of (2.6) are:
OU ' (xl , x2 ..... xl) 1 (ii) = i, je I, P-a.s.,
which again follows from (2.6). We notice that the right-hand side above does not depend upon j. This means that the total derivative
for any j, k ~ l, and for all i E I, P-a.s., 0xj ~x~ so that only changes in the aggregate portfolio XM affects the optimal final portfolios y~, i.e.
A consequence of this is that the syndicate members can hand in all their initial portfolios to a pool, and let the pool's clerk distribute parts of XM back to the syndicate's members according to the optimal sharing rules y~(XM).
Here we remark that the consequences (2.7) and (2.8) could alternatively have been derived more directly from the Saddle Point Theorem.
PARETO OPTIMALITY
If feasible, an allocation Yl, Y2, ..., Y/is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible allocation zl, z2 ..... zl such that E(ui(zi) ) ~ E(ui(y~) ) for all i, with strict inequality for at least one i. It is now easy to demonstrate that an), competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. In order to show this, let (U' (XM), Yl .... , Yl) denote the CE in Theorem 1, and suppose z is a feasible allocation which Pareto dominates y. Then E(u,(z~) ) > E(ui(y~) ) for all i with at least one strict inequality, say for insurer j. Since E(uj(zj) 
, from which n(yi*) = n(yi). But then, since u i is strictly increasing and U' > 0, we would have Eui(Yi*)> Eui(Yi), which is impossible by the definition of an equilibrium. Thus n(zi)> n(yi) for all i. Using this, we now have the contradiction n(Exi)>_ n(Ezi)> n(Zyi)= n(Exi), which proves the result.
When the optimal solution is interior, an alternative construction is the following: It is well known the Pareto optimal sharing rules are found by solving (see e.g. BORCH (1960-62) 
iel i¢l where kt, k2 .... , k~ are arbitrary positive constants. In two dimensions there is a nice graphical illustration of this point. The Lagrangian of problem (3.1) is
where the Lagrangian multiplier 2(.) is now a Borel-measurable function, so that 2 = 2 (Xu) is an 5-measurable random variable. The competitive equilibrium of Theoream I is Pareto optimal.
Proof: By comparing (3.3) and (2.6-8), the result follows after simply identifying U'(xm) with 2(XM) and ki with !/2i. Alternatively, see the introduction to this section.
KNUT K. AASE
We may notice that the identification in the above proof also explains that the function U' (.) may be interpreted as a shadow price, which is exactly what 2(.) is. Finally we notice that the formulation (2.3) and (2.4) implies that the CE solutions Yi(XM), i ~ I, must satisfy individual rationality, since clearly the solution Yi(XM)= Xi is possible, where x~ is square integrable and obviously satisfies (2.4).
EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF CE: EXAMPLES

Introduction
Theorem I gives a set of sufficient conditions for a CE when premiums, as a result of a competitive equilibrium, are unique. Since equilibrium prices can be determined only up to a multiplicative constant, we should normally get unique premiums from the budget constraints after normalization. The family of solutions we get by varying the normalization constant will not affect the sharing rules, as will be demonstrated in the examples below. It turns out, however, that the conditions (c) and (d) for existence and uniqueness are far from necessary. After the examples we shall therefore present an alternative set of sufficient conditions for existence of CE. When the sharing rules are linear, it is possible to reach a Pareto optimum by an exchange of fractions of the initial portfolios. Linear sharing rules are optimal when the individual utility functions are members of the HARA class. In a reinsurance market this means that there should be no need for any other contract than the standard proportional reinsurance contract when this is true. Applied to a stock market, the assumption that the optimal sharing rules are linear implies that there should be no need for trading an.y other securities than ordinary shares (common stock). Non-proportional reinsurance and securities such as contingent claims and options both exist and are important, so we must conclude that the preferences of decision makers are at least so diverse that they cannot be represented HARA-utility functions only. For some reason many economists refer to a market in which it is impossible to reach a Pareto optimum through an exchange of proportions of the initial portfolio as an "incomplete market ".
Illustrations
Example 1: Exponential utility.
Notice that neither (c) nor (d) hold true here. Nevertheless we shall demonstrate both existence and uniqueness of an interior CE.
Borch's Theorem gives 
U'(XM) = exp Zi~lO~i iEI
Notice how the marginal utility of the market depends upon the parameters ~i from the individual preferences, and the positive constants ki. The latter can finally be determined from the budget constraints (2.4), which we return to below. We also notice that the optimal sharing rules are given by
which verifies that the sharing rules are linear in XM. The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion equals 1/~i for each insurer i. Also the relative risk aversion is increasing in the net reserves for these insurers. The kind of treaty given in (4.2) seems common in reinsurance pratice. Insurer i will hold a share ~i/E~j of the total market, inversely proportional to his coefficient of absolute risk aversion. In order to compensate for the fact that the least risk-averse insurer will hold the larger proportion of the market, zero-sum side-payments, or fees, occur between the insurers. The last term in (4.2) represents these fees. The quotas are determined by the risk-aversion parameters only. Quota-share treaties with side-payments also occur when all the insurers have preferences represented by logarithmic utilities, quadratic utilities, as well as by power utility functions with the same exponent. For further details see LEMARIE (1990) . Let us for simplicty write (4.2) as 0c i
yi(XM) ----XMWfli
Ej~i ~j
Employing the budget constraints (2.4), we determine these constants as follows In the case where we have a riskless security in the economy in addition to the existing portfolios, it is natural to normalize so that E{U'(XM)} = 1, in which case the normalization constant K is determined from e A = E exp ~ , so that the unique vector of constants (k~, k2, ..., k/) is given by
Finally the unique set of market premiums of the optimal portfolios Yi is given as
e., by the Esscher premium principle of actuarial sciences (see BOHLMANN (1980) ).
We now present another example.
Example 2: Logarithmic utility.
Here
The individual marginal utilities are given by P-a.s., ~i > 0. 
and the linear sharing rules
Zj e I kj • o~j o~i
Using the budget constraints (2.4) we obtain the unique ray (kl, k2 .... , kl) subject to Zk~ = k, as The normalization E{U'(XM)} = 1 together with the budget constraints finally determine the constants ki. As an illustration, consider the case where I = 2 and Pl = 1/2, P2 = 3/4. Here
Only the ratio between, the two positive constants matter, so we can arbitrarily set k2 = 4/3. The marginal utility of the market equals and the optimal allocations are
The normalization E{U' (xM) } = 1 finally gives the equation for the constant h (or really kl), in which case the unique CE is determined. It should be clear that this Pareto optimum can not be achieved by an exchange of proportional reinsurance contracts. Similarly, in a stock market this type of arrangement can not be reached by an exchange of common stock.
Let us finally check condition (e). Supposing that XM is uniformly distributed on the interval [3, I+ 3] where 6 is some given parameter, we see that here is 3= 0 allowed, since the integral I0+ u-~/2du converges. In this particular case (e) is too strong.
Uniform properness
We now turn to another set of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
Following MAS-COLELL (1986) and MAS-COLELL and ZAME (1991), we define an expected utility function U(y)= E{u(y)} to be x-proper on X = L2+ (.Q, ~_9 r, P) (or uniformly proper) if there exists a scalar e > 0 such that for all y in X, ~ > 0 and z in X, U(y-otx+z) _> U(y) implies that [IzN >_ ~e.
The interpretation is that the portfolio x is desirable, in the sense that loss of an amount ctx cannot be compensated for by an additional amount az for any portfolio z, if z is sufficiently "small". When preferences are convex, properness of U at y with respect to x is equivalent to the existence of a premium functional U' such that re(z) = E{zU'} > 7r(y) = E{yU'} whenever U(z) > U(y) and has the additional property that re(x) > 0. The portfolio x in this definition is said to be extremely desirable for U. Thus, under risk aversion properness at XM is equivalent to the linear premium rule we know must exist, or individual properness at x m is equivalent to market supportability of lr. Now, it is known that properness of Ui(y) = E{ui(y)} at x is equivalent to the assertion that the random variable ui'(x) satisfies E{(ui'(x)) 2} < oo. A quasi-equilibrium is defined by the existence of a U'e X, U'4: 0, such that 7r(xi) = E{xiU'} = 7r(yi) and 7r(v)> 7r(yi) whenever Ui(v) > Ui(Yi). A quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium if Ui(v) > Ui(yi) implies that 7r(v) > ~(y~) for all i. This latter property holds at a quasi-equilibrium if n (xi)> 0 for all i. The following result is of interest in our model of an insurance market.
Thereom 3:
Suppose our conditions (a) and (b) hold and that there is any allocation z >_ 0 with Zz~ = x M P-a.s. If Xm > 0 P-a.s. and E{(ui'(zi)) 2} < ~ for each i, then there exists a quasi-equilibrium.
--The proof of this theorem can be adapted from MAS-COLELL and ZAME (1991). --Consider now the examples above, and suppose the theorem holds for z--y, the optimal allocation. The conditions for properness are then
for the Examples i, 2 and 3 respectively. As an illustration, suppose that XM is exponentially distributed with probability density f(x)= 2exp {-2x}, x_> O, f(x)= 0, x < 0. The properness condition in Example l is then equivalent to A = Ect~ > 0, which is indeed one of our assumptions. In Examples 2 and 3 the properness requirement does not seem to add any new restrictions to the ones that are already naturally present. One advantage with our conditions (a)-(e) is the interior solution they provide, which gives us the characterization (2.6). Theorem 3 does not rule out corner solutions.
Uniform properness is incompatible with the condition ui'(O+)--+ co.
Uniform properness was used in a model of a reinsurance market in AASE (1990).
RISK TOLERANCE
Here we demonstrate a simple consequence of Borch's Theorem'
ui" (Yi (XM)) Y[ (XM) U" (XM)
(5.1) --, it I, P-a.s.,
u[ (yi (XM)) U' (XM)
which follows from differentiating (2.6). Equation ( 
R(xm) i~I Ri(Yi(Xg))
The quantity I/R is called the risk tolerance. The above result has been found by BORCH (1985) ; see also BOHLMANN (1980) for the special case of exponential utility functions. The result (5.3) says that in a Pareto optimum the risk tolerance of the market as a whole is equal to the sum of the risk tolerances of the participants. If one member is risk neutral, his risk tolerance will be infinite, and hence that of the market. This may be interpreted as saying that in a Pareto optimum all risk should be carried by the risk neutral participants. We can also easily derive the following
Oyi (XM) R (XM)
(5.4) --, i e I, P-a.s.
(~XM Ri(yi(XM))
If all the syndicate's members are strictly risk averse, then Ri > 0, and R > 0 follows from (5.3), so that y[ (XM) > 0 a.s. from (5.4). This means that as the market portfolio increases, all the insurers increase their portfolios in a Pareto optimum.
RISK ADJUSTMENT OF THE PROBABILITY MEASURE
The premium functional ~ can alternatively be represented by a risk adjusted probability measure as follows : Suppose there exists a riskless security x0 in the economy, and assume without loss of generality that x 0(co) = 1 P-a.s. We can then normalize such that E{U' (xM)} --I, as we have suggested earlier. Suppose that P[U'(xM) > 0] = 1. Define a new measure P* as follows:
(6.1)
P*(A) = I U'(xM(og))dP(og).
A Clearly P*(12)= 1 from our normalization assuption. Also it follows from integration theory that P*(.) is countably additive, confirming that P* is a probability measure. Finally P* and P are mutually absolutely continuous with respect to each other, meaning that if P(B)= 0 then P*(B)=0 and if P*(A) = 0 then P(A)= 0 for any A, B~..Y-. Using P* we can express the premium as follows (6.2)
n(x) = E(U'(xM)x) = ~ U'(xM(o9)) x(o9) dP(og) d 12
= ~ x(og) dP*(og)=E*(x), d 12
where E* refers to the expectation operator under P*. The interpretation is that the market premium can be computed using an altered probability measure P* corresponding to a world of market risk neutrality. We call P* the risk adjusted probability measure. Notice from (6.1) that the market's marginal utility U'(xM) corresponds to the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P* with respect to P, i.e. dP *
This type of construction is of considerable importance in the timecontinuous case (see e.g., AASE (1988-92-93) .
Returning to the illustrations in Section 4.2, we now see that in general the Radon-Nikodym derivative depends on the preferences. This at least holds in equilibrium models. This fact should be contrasted with the literature on contingent claims analysis. In the arbitrage pricing theory, where the uncertainty is modeled by Ito-diffusions, this quantity is preference independent, which clearly does not hold when "jumps" can occur as in our model.
INSURANCE PREMIUMS
The foregoing has been formulated in terms of portfolios and market values of net reserves. To obtain market premiums of insurance contracts, we note that the net reserves of insurer i consist of assets ai less of liabilities under the insurance contracts held by the insurer. Let the non-negative random variable zi(o2) represent claim payments under the contracts if the state of the world becomes o2e£2, ie I. Let the events be completely specified by ,.~"~-.~-O'(Z I , Z 2 .... , zl), so that the assets ai are riskless, and write (7. l)
Now we have that
where aM = Z a~ and ZM = Z z~. We define the market disutility of claim payments by the function V, where
V(ZM) = U' (aM--ZM).
Clearly V'(ZM)= --U"(aM--ZM)> 0 because of assumption (a) and (5.3)
. Formula (7.2) simply says that the market value of the insurer's portfolio is equal to his riskless assets less the market premium for insurance of the liabilities. This formula makes it easy to translate results expressed in terms of net reserve values into insurance premiums. Notice in particular that if for some portfolio x~ the premium n(x;)< E(x~), we get from (7.2) that the corresponding insurance premium satisfies n(zi)> E(z~), so that the economic risk premium {n(z~)-E(zj)} of this insurance contract is positive. After normalization, we find in general that the risk premium can be written as follows
Since the marginal disutility of the market increases as the aggregate claims in the market increase, from (7.4) we may be tempted to believe that for claims which are positively correlated with zM, the risk premium is positive, and for claims which are negatively correlated with zM, the risk premium is negative. Both these cases make perfectly sense in a rational reinsurance market with risk averse insurers. However, there exist joint distributions for z = (z~, zz ..... zl) under which this result may not hold true. Covariances are measures of linear statistical dependance, and can only be considered as a good measure of "stochastic association" under multinormality. In insurance an assumption of jointly normally distributed claims is usually not very realistic. Among other things can claims only take on non-negative values. We are therefore reluctant to use the nice results obtainable from an assumption of multinormality in insurance. Here we cite HARALD CRAM~R (1930) who wrote : "...in many cases the approximation obtained by using the normal function is not sufficiently good to justify the conclusions that have been drawn in this way". In the last section of the paper we nevertheless briefly discuss multinormality.
8. RISK EXCHANGE BETWEEN" A POLICYHOLDER AND AN INSURER
The problem of risk exchange between a buyer of insurance and an insurer has been extensively studied under varying conditions in insurance economics, and some of the contributions can also be found in the actuarial literature. By restricting attention to the buyers problem only, MOSSIN (1968) showed that if the compensation c(x)= o~x is received by the policyholder if the damage amounts to x, where 0 < ~ < 1 is a constant, and if the premium paid is ~tp, then if p > Ex it is never optimal to take full coverage. Borch later modified this, and considered instead a premium p= o~Ex+c, where c>0 is some constant. He showed, simply using Jensen's inequality, that ct* = 1 is optimal if it is rational for the risk-averse customer to buy insurance. The constant c he interpreted as administrative costs. ARROW (1974) used Borch's original risk-exchange model of , and found that a policy with a deductible is optimal. His premium contains a fixed percentage loading, which has later been interpreted as a special example of a cost function by RAVlV (1979) , who analyzed the problem for general cost functions, using the maximum principle.
Here we remark that a loading is perhaps more naturally associated with an economic risk premium. HOLMSTROM (1979) analyzed the problem under moral hazard, and showed that this gives rise to deductibles. Moral hazard is clearly a problem in this particular kind of risk exchange. ROTHSCHILD and STIGLITZ (1976) considered the case with imperfect information, and demonstrated deductibles for low-risk individuals in a very simple model, and TOWNSEND (1979) established deductibles under a certain kind of nonobservability, where there is a cost involved by verification of the true state. LANDSBERGER and MEILIJSON (1990) , on the other hand, explained deductibles in insurance from another perspective, by the use of preferences derived from so called star-shaped utility functions. MOFFET (1979) used Borch's Theorem directly on the risk exchange problem that we discuss below.
In this section we want to demonstrate that the risk exchange model of this paper can be used to establish some simple, yet general results, still abstracting from the problems caused by asymmetric information and moral hazard. These results, we claim, constitute the natural benchmark from which refinements should be obtained. In particular we are interested in the form of the premium functional in this situaion, derived from (2.2).
To this end we consider st policyholder with initial wealth w~, utility function ul satifying conditions (a) and (b). Against a premium p the insurer offers a policy that reimburses the policyholder an amount l(x) if a claim of amount x occurs. The insurer has initial wealth w0, and his utility function we denote by u0(') satisfying u~(.) > 0, ud'(.) _< 0. A natural constraint on the compensation function l(x) is
O_<l(x)_<x
for all x.
Ignoring this constraint for the moment, a direct application of Borch's Theorem to the present sharing arrangement gives (8.
I ) u~ (Wo + p -I (x )) = (k, ]ko) u~ (w, -p -x + I (x ) ) .
Differentiating (8.1) with respect to x leads to
Using (8.1), we get directly
which can be written
Ro(wo+p-l(x))+R,(w,-p-x+l(x))
where RI and R0 again stand for the measures of absolute risk aversion. If both parties are risk averse, then from (8.3) we see that (8.4) 0<l'(x)< 1 for all x>0.
Letting I(0) = 0, the mean value theorem implies that (8.5) 0<l(x)<x for all x>0.
This means that the Pareto optimal sharing rule involves a positive amount of coinsurance, or full coverage is not Pareto optimal.
Notice that policies with a deductible can not be Parero optimal. This follows since l( both violating (8.4 ). This holds quite generally without using any constraints on the compensation function l(x).
Referring to the literature cited above, policies with a deductible can only be Pareto optimal in models where one or more of the following are included; costs, moral hazard, asymmetric information, non-observability or alternative preferences (e.g., star-shaped utility).
Example 1: (Exponential utility).
Suppose ul(wl)= 1-exp{-awl}, Uo(Wo)= 1-exp{-bw0} for two positive constants a and b. In this case R0 = b and R~ = a, so the absolute risk aversions are constants and independent of wealth levels. It now follows directly from (8.3) that I'(x) = a/(a+b), or l(x) = ax/(a+b)+c, where c is an intergration constant. If I(0)= 0, c = 0. In this case if Ri = a is large compared to R o = b, l(x) is approximately equal to x, so that full coverage is then approximately Pareto optimal. In practice this seems reasonable, since the absolute risk aversion of the policyholder is usually large compared to that of the insurer.
From (8.3) we see that the conclusion of this example also holds quite generally, i.e., if R] is very large as compared to R 0 for all input values, then full coverage is approximately Pareto optimal. Quite generally, if we tried to solve the risk exchange problem in this section imposing the natural constraints on l(x), the application of the maximum principle would yield the same conclusions as above: The Pareto optimal deductible is zero in the absence of operating expenses (RAvIV (1979) ).
Turning to the premium, the problem of determining p is usually overlooked or ignored in the above kind of analyses, where p is simply assumed to be given as "a positive number".
Suppose we use the pricing principles of Section 2 of this paper, and apply them to the present "mini-market". We would like to answer the question of how the resulting equilibrium-based premium p depends on the parameters of the problem. First we need to derive the shadow price. Using Borch's Theorem we get
and (8.7) kou~(wo+p-I(x)) = U'(wl +Wo-X).
The budget constraints of the two parties are 
Here yo(xM) = Wo+p--I(x),yi(XM) = W[--p--x+I(x), XM = WI +Wo--X = W--X, XO = WO
As an illustration, suppose that x is exponentially distributed with parameter 2, so that Ex = 1/2. Then the simple formula p = a/ [2(a+b)-ab] obtains, where the parameter 2 > 1/A. Notice that p increases with Ex and with a. If 2 < a, then p increases with b, with the opposite result if 2 > a. Notice that an increase in R~ = a has here two effects, both working in the same direction: First the absolute risk aversion of the policyholder increases, and second the coverage increases; so we would expect a large premium p in both cases. An increase in R 0 = b implies on the one hand less coverage, but on the other hand the insurer becomes more averse towards risk. These two mutually competing facts explain the more complex comparative statics for b.
The risk neutral case can be studied by letting b---~ 0. Then p ~ Ex follows from (8.11) by the monotone convergence theorem, i.e., we obtain the usual "actuarial fair" premium in the limit. Alternatively we could try the characterization in Section 2 directly with Uo (w) = b + cw, c > 0, a constant. It is then straightforward to show that the shadow price U'(XM)--Z !, again leading to premium given by the "principle of equivalence" above. (Formally the latter derivation is not valid when u~ (w) = 0 for all w.) O Examples 1 and 2 are somewhat specialized in that the absolute risk aversion is independent of wealth. In general we should also expect the premium to depend on the aggregate level of wealth w in the market. This is indeed of importance in actual markets where insurance contracts are traded at market prices. Consider the following example: Notice how the premium p in general depends on the wealth level w. It is seen that unless the wealth of the customer is too large, i.e., when wl < E{xU'(XM)}, the premium decreases as w0 increases as well as when wl increases, whereas the premium increases as a function of w0 when wl > E{xU'(XM)}. In general the premium is a decreasing function ofw. This is in accordance with the general observation that the premiums tend to decrease as the "capacity" (= w) in the market increases and vice verca.
In the limiting case where p ~ I, U'(XM)~ 1 a.s. and p ~ Wo Ex/(w-Ex) by the dominated convergence theorem. In the limit, approaching risk neutrality, the optimal compensation scheme is I(x) = WoX/(W-Ex), costing its actuarial fair value E(I(x)} = Wo Ex/(w-Ex).
As an illustration, suppose that x is uniformly distributed on (0, wl), where w0 > wt. The premium is then which depends on the aggregate wealth w of the two parties, their attitude towards risk as measured by p and the reserves w0 of the insurer. As p ~ 1, this expression is seen to converge to Pl = WlWo/2(w-wl/2), which is exactly E{It(x)}, where ll(x)= (wo+pl)x/w is the optimal sharing rule for this particular premium Pl.
AN INSURANCE VERSION OF THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
We now discuss the case when x = (x~, x2,..., xt) is jointly multinormally distributed. As noted before, this case has limited applicability in insurance economics. However some of the results in this model remain true even if the assumption of normality is dropped. The first problem we encounter is to find a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Our earlier theorems can not be directly applied here, since x can take on negative values with positive probability. NIELSEN (1990) has a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium in a CAPM-model in financial economics. In his model the investor has a utility function U(~, a) which is a function of the mean and the standard deviation of the total portfolio return. Mean-variance behavior is consistent with expected utility maximization with general utility functions if the returns follow the distributions described by CHAMBERLAIN (1983) and OWEN and RABINOWITCH (1983) , which include the multinormal distribution. In the present model the optimal allocation may not 206 KNUT K. AASE be a linear function of xu, in which case y is not necessarily multinormally distributed. Expected utility maximization with general utility functions can not, in our model of an insurance market, in general be represented by mean-variance utility functions U(/z, a), unless the utility functions happen to be members of the HARA-family with the same cautiousness. In this latter case Nielsen's sufficient conditions are possibly appropriate in our model.
For the moment supposing an interior equilibrium exists, its characterization is then straightforward. Under our normalization assumption E{U'(XM)} = I, the premium functional can be written
Here (n (xi)-E(xi)) is the economic risk premium of xi. From the assumption of multinormality it follows that
Since (9.2) holds for each of the initial portfolios, clearly
By summation over i we obtain
from the linearity of the pricing functional n (.) and from standard properties of the expectation and the covariance operators. Rearranging, we finally have the insurance version of the capital asset pricing model as follows:
The risk premium of any of the initial portfolios can be written as the risk premium of the market portfolio multiplied by the normalized covariance term, the portfolio's beta in the market.
The result (9.2) is often referred to as Stein's lemma. The first derivation in the economics literature seems to be due to RUmNSTEIN (1973) . Using a Taylor series expansion, he assumed that the function U' possesses derivatives of all orders and that these functions can be integrated. Below we give a simple proof, where U' need not even be one time differentiable for (9.3) to result by the above procedure. Note that (9.3) follows from (a) only. Thus the assumptions that U' is one time differentiable and that the expectation of U'(XM) exists, are really not needed in the above step. If U" exists for all reals together with its expectation, then (a) and (b) imply (9.2). For an extension of this result, proved by entirely different methods, see WEI and LEE (1988) . Note that we have used the equilibrium-result in Section 2 that
U' (x) = u' (XM).
We may also find the sign of the risk premium of any Pareto optimal, linear sharing rule yi (XM) . In this case we find
I]Ox
By (5.4) we notice that this beta is positive. The risk premium of all the portfolios have then the same sign as the risk premium of the market portfolio, which in this case is negative. This result corresponds to "investors hold efficient portfolios in capital market equilibrium" in the theory of capital markets, whereas the fact that E{y[(xg)}>O corresponds to "efficient portfolios have positive betas". Notice that the negative risk premiums here only mean that the insurers require a positive expected return on their reinsurance exchanges, since this expected return simply equals
[E(yi)-z~(yi)]/z~(xi) > O.
Returning to (9.3) suppose that one of the initial portfolios, x~ say, has a negative correlation with the market. The market finds this portfolio so valuable that it accepts a negative expected return on x~ in equilibrium.
As for the characterization (9.3), there might exist other joint probability distributions giving the same separation result (see for example Ross (1976) and CHAMBERLAIN (1983) ). A different line of attack has traditionally been to impose further conditions on preferences. For example, if the marginal utility of the market U' is linear, then this separation follows as well.
Apparently this result seems to require no assumptions regarding the joint probability distribution of x. However, linear marginal market utility is usually a consequence of quadratic utility functions representing the preferences of the individual insurers, which means that the probabilities of falling beyond the satiation points should equal zero in order for condition (a) to remain valid. Otherwise the preferences are not monotonic, and risky investments are inferior compared to the riskless. Thus conditions must then indirectly be imposed on the joint probability distribution of x as well. For example is the multinormal distribution not acceptable in this situation. In such cases the conditions of Theorem 1 may be met, and the characterization (9.3) be valid. We should add, however, that one obvious advantage of imposing distributional assumptions on x rather than assumptions directly on preferences (if these can at all be avoided), is that the former can be empirically tested using statistical methods, whereas the latter are much harder to verify/refute from available data.
The classical version of the one-period CAPM in a capital market was developed by Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin. The classical one-period CAPM has also been developed without the assumption of a riskless asset by BLACK (1972) . In a multiperiod setting MERTON (1972) has developed an intertemporal CAPM, where the prices of the risky assets are assumed to follow Ito-diffusions. In a dynamic, intertemporal reinsurance context, where the claims processes are represented by random, marked point processes, an insurance version of an intertemporal CAPM can be found in AASE (1993).
SUMMARY
From the above analysis we observe that the premiums in a reinsurance market typicall); must depend on:
(i) The stochastic properties of the risk itself.
(ii) The stochastic relationship between the particular risk z and claims in the market as a whole, described by the covariance between V(ZM) and z. (iii) The attitude towards risk in the market as a whole, represented by V=U'.
(iv) The total assets of all the insurers in the market, represented by a M .
A realistic theory of insurance premiums must of course take all these four elements into account. This is however rarely done in actuarial risk theory. Several books have been written on insurance premium principles, some even recent, where only the first of these four elements are covered.
Some obvious weaknesses of the above model are the following. There is in reality no time dimension in these models; trade is supposed to take place only at one point in time, and the world more or less ends at the next time point. In models of (re)insurance markets the risks may be more realistically represented by random, marked point processes. A model where trade can take place at any time point t in an interval [0, T] is given in AASE (1992-93) . There it is shown that the market's attitude towards risk can be separated into two components; one related to frequency risk and the other related to claim size risk, given that an accident has occurred. In order to fully understand these results, however, it appears to be essential to have the above model in mind. This is so since the present derivation basically tells us what happens at each time point of jump of the vector x of the stochastic process representing the exogenously given portfolios in the reinsurance market. For example is our interpretation of the market marginal utility crucial also in the dynamic case. Therefore the one-period analysis can be viewed as a necessary preparation in order to proceed to more realistic, but at the same time more complicated and mathematically challenging models of equilibrium premium formation in a dynamic exchange economy under uncertainty.
